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ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS: PROTECTIVE
SHIELDS OR SMOKING GUNS? HOW TO
ENCOURAGE THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO
PERFORM ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS
AND STILL MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE
ENFORCEMENT.
INTRODUCTION
In the rapidly increasing effort to clean up the environment and halt
those who pollute it, environmental statutes are by no means new
weapons in the arsenal of the agencies whose task it is to protect the
environment.' However, the federal government's use of criminal
prosecutions to enforce the environmental statutes and punish their
transgressors has dramatically increased in the past few years.2 Along
1. In 1963, Congress enacted the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671(q)
(West 1983 & Supp. 1991). Since then, Congress has enacted several additional envi-
ronmental statutes. See, eg., Toxic Substances Control Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671
(1988) (enacted in 1986); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1991) (enacted in 1972); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 4321-4370c (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); Resource Conservation Recovery Act of
1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
2. James M. Strock, EPA's Environmental Enforcement in the 1990's, 20 ENvTL. L.
REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,327 (Aug. 1990) (discussing the EPA's past, present, and fu-
ture enforcement programs); Paul M. Barrett, Official Mulls Ways to Bar Prosecution of
Polluters that Clean Up Their Acts, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 1990, at A12 (reporting that
the environmental chief of the Justice Department is considering safe harbors for pol-
luters who are taking remedial actions); Marianne Lavelle, Enforcement and the EPA,
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with a general increase in enforcement actions,3 the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Justice, and the United
States Attorney's Offices have reinvigorated the environmental statutes
with the threat and use of criminal prosecutions for environmental
crimes.4 These efforts are certain to continue due to congressional
legislation that will augment EPA's criminal investigation staff,5 signif-
icantly increase the potential fines that may be levied upon environ-
mental criminals, 6 and possibly lead to substantial jail terms for
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 24, 1990, at 1, 50 (discussing pressure on the EPA to implement
harsher enforcement measures).
3. The EPA collected almost $37 million in civil penalties for fiscal 1988, and in
fiscal 1989 reported collecting penalties in excess of $35 million. In addition, the
Agency initiated more than 4,100 administrative actions against violators, 34% more
than in 1988. See Strock, supra note 2, at 10,327 (reporting the number of administra-
tive actions and civil referrals to the Department of Justice from 1972 to 1989); Lavelle,
supra note 2, at 48 (reporting that 75 percent of all EPA's penalties were imposed be-
tween 1985 and 1989).
4. Former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh has said that prosecuting envi-
ronmental crimes is among the Justice Department's highest priorities. Kevin A. Gay-
nor, A System Spinning Out of Control, ENvTL. F., May/June 1990, at 28. The
Department of Justice reported a "record-breaking year of criminal-law enforcement"
of environmental violations in 1990, with 134 felony indictments returned by federal
grand juries. This represented a 33% increase over the previous year. Barrett, supra
note 2, at 12. In 1989, the EPA's Criminal Enforcement Program produced 76 convic-
tions for environmental crimes. Strock, supra note 2, at 10,327. See, eg., United States
v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming defendant's felony conviction for
aiding and abetting hazardous waste disposal), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990);
United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding defendant
guilty of unlawfully transmitting hazardous waste); United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc.,
546 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (affirming defendants' convictions for discharging
pollutants without a permit into navigable waters), aff'd, 703 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.), cert
denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983). See also supra note 2 for a discussion of recent and future
EPA enforcement actions.
5. In 1981, the EPA did not employ any criminal investigators. By 1990, the
Agency employed 54 investigators. With the passage of the Pollution Prosecution Act
of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991), commentators expect the
number of criminal investigators at EPA to increase to 200 by 1995. FRANK B. FRIED-
MAN, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 12-13 (1991). See also
James R. Moore et al., Why Perform Environmental Audits If They Enhance the Risk
of Criminal Enforcement? 10 n.6 (Sept. 5, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Washington University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law) (arguing that the
EPA and Department of Justice should eliminate the reasons why industry questions
auditing); Lavelle, supra note 2, at 50.
6. The Fine Enhancement Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571-72 (Supp. 1991) will allow
courts to impose fines of up to $500,000 for one felony charge. Moore et al., supra note
5, at 11 n.8.
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violators.7
Through this emphasis on criminal enforcement of the environmen-
tal statutes, the federal government has indicated that it plans to en-
force environmental compliance through penalties. An alternate
method would be to entice the regulated community to police itself
through programs that can better achieve effective compliance. Addi-
tionally, such an approach would be less burdensome upon the govern-
ment's regulatory agencies. A voluntary environmental audit,
corrective action, and self-disclosure program would provide the regu-
lated community with the enticement and prompting it needs. The
switch from criminal enforcement to an environmental audit policy de-
serves attention because it represents a philosophical change in the
United States' environmental enforcement policy from punishment, re-
active, to compliance, proactive.8
Part I of this Recent Development examines an illustrative case of
the government's present enforcement policy at work. Part II briefly
describes and discusses environmental audits. Part III analyzes re-
cently issued Department of Justice guidelines as well as the EPA's
existing policy statements concerning criminal prosecutions and envi-
ronmental audits. Part IV surveys the audit policies of other govern-
ment agencies. Part V discusses the concerns of both government and
private industry. Finally, Part VI looks at what can be done to pro-
mote environmental auditing and compliance instead of after-the-fact
enforcement and prosecution.
I. THE WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY: A CASE STUDY
Weyerhaeuser operates a sawmill in Aberdeen, Washington on the
Shannon Slough, a tributary of the Chehalis River.9 After lumber is
cut and finished, it is stenciled with the company's logo and the ends
are painted to prevent cracking. 0 On five separate occasions, Weyer-
7. New sentencing guidelines require jail terms for even corporate executive first-
offenders who are convicted of environmental crimes. Moore et al., supra note 5, at 11.
8. See William N. Farran III & Thomas L. Adams, Jr., Environmental Regulatory
Objective: Auditing and Compliance or Crime and Punishment, 21 ENVTL. L. REP.
(Envt. L. Inst.) 10,239, 10,239 (May 1991) (arguing that the EPA should encourage
auditing programs by legally protecting companies that participate in environmental
self-audits and undertake corrective action voluntarily).
9. Peter Lewis, Weyerhaeuser Fined for Polluting Slough, SEATrLE TIMEs, Nov. 16,
1990, at D8.
10. Steve Miletich, Weyerhaeuser Pleads Guilty to Pollution at Aberdeen Mill, SEAT-
TLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 17, 1990, at Al.
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haeuser discharged the red paint waste and wash water from their seal-
ing and stenciling operation into the slough"I in violation of the Clean
Water Act (CWA). 2 Acting upon a tip, the EPA began investigating
the mill's compliance efforts.' 3 After a search warrant was served
upon the Aberdeen mill, the EPA learned of Weyerhaeuser's dis-
charges into the Shannon Slough.' 4 The United States Attorney in Se-
attle brought criminal charges against Weyerhaeuser, which eventually
pleaded guilty to five misdemeanor violations of the CWA."5
The United States could have charged Weyerhaeuser with felony vi-
olations of the CWA 6 or proceeded civilly instead. 7 Curiously, the
United States Attorney decided to forego felony charges and seek only
misdemeanor counts because of Weyerhaeuser's internal environmen-
tal compliance audit program.'" They might have pursued Weyer-
11. Id. Weyerhaeuser admitted that on each occasion it used about 20 gallons of
water to clean paint spraying equipment and then discharged the water into the slough.
When released into the slough, the waste water contained approximately 5% paint resi-
due. Id. at A8. EPA investigators discovered paint residue 12 inches into the bed of the
slough. Lewis, supra note 9, at D8.
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1988) (proscribing the discharge of pollutants unless it com-
plies with specified provisions). See United States v. Weyerhaeuser Co., No. CR90-
298S (W.D. Wash. Nov. 21, 1990) (Judgment and Order of Restitution); see also 33
U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(1)(A) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991) (providing the penalties which ap-
ply to illegal pollutant discharge constituting misdemeanor violations).
13. Miletich, supra note 10, at A8.
14. Id.
15. Id., at Al. See also Lewis, supra note 9, at D8. Weyerhaeuser Co. agreed to
pay the maximum fine under the Clean Water Act of $25,000 per violation for a total of
$125,000. The lumber company deposited an additional $375,000 into a trust fund to
study and clean the Shannon Slough. Lewis, supra note 9, at D8. See also Miletich,
supra note 10, at A8. Finally, the court placed Weyerhaeuser on probation until it paid
all fines and trust payments and signed the Trust Agreement. United States v. Weyer-
haeuser Co., No. CR90-298S (W.D. Wash. Nov. 21, 1990) (Judgment and Order of
Restitution).
16. See Lewis, supra note 9, at D8 (discussing the United States Attorney's decision
to charge the company with a misdemeanor rather than a felony). See also Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311, 1319(c)(2)(A) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991) (proscribing pollu-
tants discharge without a permit, and providing the penalties associated with felony
violations).
17. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); 33
U.S.C.A. § 1319(b) (1988) (authorizing civil actions against any defendant who dis-
charges without a permit).
18. Lewis, supra note 9, at DS; Miletich, supra note 10, at A8. Weyerhaeuser con-
ducted voluntary environmental audits in 1987 and 1988. These audits discovered that
similar paint waste discharges had been going on for nine years. These audits led Wey-
erhaeuser to undertake corrective steps before EPA's investigation; however, the gov-
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haeuser with only civil sanctions had the lumber company addressed
the illegal discharges more aggressively.19 Weyerhaeuser's internal au-
dits showed that the company was aware of the problem before EPA
uncovered it, but that Weyerhaeuser dragged its feet in remedying the
violations.2" The United States Attorney praised Weyerhaeuser's ef-
forts at an internal environmental audit program, but chastised the
company for not adequately following up the deficiencies that those
reports disclosed.21 In essence, the lumber company's undertaking of a
voluntary environmental audit was a step in the right direction, but it
was not a big enough step.
The Weyerhaeuser Company violated the provisions of the CWA2 2
in Washington State and learned first hand about the government's
preference for criminal environmental prosecutions. This situation ex-
emplifies the competing interests that conducting internal environmen-
tal audits brings to bear upon a corporation and prosecutor. Initially,
the United States Attorney had to consider whether Weyerhaeuser's
environmental compliance audit was satisfactory or qualifying. The
United States Attorney also had to decide how much credit to give the
corporation for voluntarily conducting an environmental audit. Fur-
ther, he had to determine how to adjust that credit when the audit
results were not promptly acted upon. As for the corporation, Weyer-
haeuser must determine whether it is justified in continuing its environ-
mental audit program in light of the fact that their audit results were
used against them in the criminal charges for the violations. Addition-
ally, the government has put Weyerhaeuser, and others like it, on no-
tice that they must react quickly and thoroughly to environmental
audit results. Thus, environmental audits serve as both a sword and
shield for the corporation.
ernment felt that the actions taken were "too slow and inadequate." Notwithstanding,
the United States Attorney praised the company for conducting environmental audits,
identifying problems, and taking some steps to address them. Lewis, supra note 9, at
D8. See also Miletich, supra note 10, at Al (reporting Weyerhaeuser's guilty plea).
19. See supra notes 17-18 (addressing civil liability for discharging pollutants with-
out a permit, and possible reasons that the United States Attorney brought criminal
charges rather than a civil action).
20. See supra note 18 for a discussion of Weyerhaeuser's past internal audits, and its
delay in responding to the audits' results.
21. Lewis, supra note 9, at D8; Miletich, supra note 10, at Al.
22. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991) (for-
merly known as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972).
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II. ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS: WHAT ARE THEY?
23
Regulated entities use many types of environmental audits.24 The
type of audit a company uses depends on the size and nature of that
company. That is, each company will and should adopt an audit struc-
ture and scope that fits its particular needs.25 A large corporation with
many sites may want to establish an environmental auditing team that
visits each site periodically. In contrast, a smaller company with a sin-
gle operation may want to contract with an independent auditing
group. While many auditing options exist from which companies may
choose, many elements of the audits should be identical.2 6
23. This section is intended to acquaint the reader with the basics of an
environmental audit. The specific details and requirements of environmental audits,
however, are not within the scope of this Recent Development. For further information
regarding environmental audits, see EPA Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51
Fed. Reg. 25,004 (1986) [hereinafter Environmental Auditing Policy Statement]. See
also FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 81-111 (describing the environmental audit process).
24. The EPA defines an environmental audit as "a systematic, documented, peri-
odic and objective review by regulated entities of facility operations and practices re-
lated to meeting environmental requirements." Environmental Auditing Policy
Statement, supra note 23, at 25,006. Others have defined it as "an independent ap-
praisal of a corporation's environmental control systems and its environmental assets
and liabilities to enable management to make rational decisions relating to environmen-
tal matters." Phillip D. Reed, Environmental Audits and Confidentiality: Can What
You Know Hurt You as Much as What You Don't Know?, 13 ENVmL. L. REP. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,303 (Oct. 1983) (suggesting that a policy of ignoring environmental audit re-
ports in administrative enforcement actions could encourage auditing, yet not weaken
enforcement efforts).
25. See Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 25,006 (dis-
cussing purposes which environmental audits might serve). This might account for the
different terms companies use to refer to environmental audits. These terms include:
environmental assessment, environmental survey, environmental surveillance, environ-
mental review, environmental appraisal, environmental self-audit, environmental self-
assessment, and environmental compliance audit. See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at
89-90 (discussing how to structure a successful assessment program).
26. The EPA has identified several elements that "an effective environmental audit-
ing system" should include:
a. Explicit top management support for such auditing and the commitment to
follow up auditing findings;
b. An environmental auditing function independent of audited activities;
c. Adequate team staffing and auditor training;
d. Explicit audit program objectives, scope, resources and frequency;
e. A process which collects, analyzes, interprets and documents information suffi-
cient to achieve audit objectives;
f. A process which includes specific procedures to promptly prepare candid, clear
and appropriate written reports on audit findings, corrective actions, and schedules
for implementation; and
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Environmental audits break down into two general types: compli-
ance audits and management audits.27 The first, a compliance audit, is
an independent assessment2" of the company's compliance with envi-
ronmental statutes and regulatory requirements. 29 The second, a man-
agement audit, is broader in scope and examines the company's
management systems and procedures for ensuring compliance with en-
vironmental regulations and statutes.3" These different audits are not
mutually exclusive, and may actually complement one another in cer-
tain situations.3"
g. A process which includes quality assurance procedures to assure the accuracy
and thoroughness of such audits.
J. Michael Abbott, Environmental Audits: Pandora's Box or Aladdin's Lamp, 31 A.F. L.
REV. 225, 225 (1989) (citing Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 23,
at 25,009). See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 88-89 (delineating certain standard
characteristics of environmental assessment programs that can apply to all companies).
27. Memorandum from Thomas L. Adams, Jr., Assistant Administrator for En-
forcement and Compliance Monitoring, Final EPA Policy on the Inclusion of Environ-
mental Auditing Provisions in Enforcement Settlements 3 (Nov. 14, 1986) (available
from EPA's Legal Enforcement Policy Branch) (describing the two types of audits and
outlining the circumstances in which each type of audit is most appropriate); George
Van Cleve, The Changing Intersection of Environmental Auditing, Environmental Law
and Enforcement Policy, Address Before the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Con-
ference on Corporate Governance: Beyond the Transactional Audit 5 (Sept. 17, 1990)
(transcript on file with Washington University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law)
(comparing the two types of environmental audits with two types of financial audits
required under federal securities laws).
28. This independent assessment is distinct from the independent inspection pro-
grams of the environmental regulatory agencies or the periodic compliance and report-
ing activities required of regulated and permitted entities under certain environmental
programs. Allen J. Danzig et al., Environmental Auditing: Reaching the Bottom Line in
Compliance, NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Jan. 1987, at 3. See also Environmental
Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 25,006 (stating that environmental audits
do not replace regulatory agency inspections; rather, they improve compliance by com-
plementing federal, state, and local oversight). See The Environmental Law Institute,
Environmental Audit Issue Paper: Duties to Report or Disclose Information on the
Environmental Aspects of Business Activities, (Sept. 1985) for an analysis of environ-
mental laws' reporting requirements.
29. See Adams, supra note 27, at 3 (describing the scope of the audit requirement);
Van Cleve, supra note 27, at 5 (comparing financial and environmental audits).
30. See Adams, supra note 27, at 3; Van Cleve, supra note 27, at 5.
31. See Adams, supra note 27, at 3 (explaining that in some circumstances both
compliance and management audits are appropriate).
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
396 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 42:389
III. PRESENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT POLICY ON
ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS
Both the Department of Justice and the Environmental Protection
Agency encourage the environmentally regulated community to volun-
tarily perform compliance or management audits. The federal govern-
ment hopes that these audits will induce regulated companies to
comply without extensive agency oversight. Most significantly, volun-
tary environmental audits proactively address compliance, rather than
a reactive governmental response via administrative, civil, or criminal
sanctions. The following two sections examine the presently estab-
lished guidelines and standards.32
A. The Department of Justice Guidelines
On July 1, 1991, the Department of Justice issued comprehensive
guidelines33 designed to encourage corporations to examine, address,
and disclose their environmental non-compliance while avoiding poten-
tial exposure to criminal liability.34 The guidelines delineate several
factors that the Department will consider in deciding how to prosecute
violations.35 The Department identified three significant corporate ac-
tions that it will take into account when deciding whether to prose-
cute.36 First, the Department will determine whether the person3 7
made a voluntary disclosure of the noncompliance and when.38 For a
company to receive the maximum benefit from its disclosure, the dis-
32. For a brief discussion of state initiatives in the environmental audit field, see
FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 109-11.
33. United States Department of Justice, Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecu-
tions for Environmental Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance
or Disclosure Efforts by the Violator (July 1, 1991) [hereinafter United States Depart-
ment of Justice] (on file with Washington University Journal of Urban and Contempo-
rary Law).
34. Jonathan Moses & Wade Lambert, Environmental- Wrongdoing Guide Issued,
WALL ST. J., September 25, 1991, at B4.
35. United States Department of Justice, supra note 33, at 2-6. In addition, the
Department of Justice document applies the guidelines to hypothetical examples. Id. at
6-14.
36. Id. at 2-5 (describing factors that Justice Department attorneys should consider
in determining whether to prosecute). The guidelines emphasize that this list of factors
is not exhaustive or exclusive. Rather, "[t]hey merely illustrate some of the types of
information which is relevant to [the] exercise of prosecutorial discretion." Id. at 2.
37. In the Department of Justice guidelines, the term "person" includes business
and non-profit entities in addition to individuals. Id. at 3 n.I.
38. Id. at 3.
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closure must be prompt and timely.3 9 Particularly important is
whether the disclosure substantially aided the agency's investigative ac-
tivities." Disclosure of information already required to be reported to
the government does not qualify as a voluntary disclosure.4"
Second, the Department will evaluate whether the corporation coop-
erated with the government's investigation.4 2 Similar to disclosures,
cooperation should be timely and complete to receive full credit.4 3 The
Department of Justice may give consideration to a company's coopera-
tion even if it made no voluntary disclosure. Cooperation is thus an
independent factor that may allow leniency for the person.44 Also, as
with disclosures, the quantity and quality of the party's assistance
should be considered.45 Thus, a corporation that provides the govern-
ment with all of its internal or external compliance data will have coop-
erated more extensively than one that attempts to protect or conceal
such information. 4
6
The third significant factor the Department of Justice guidelines
identified is whether the corporation already has in place an environ-
mental compliance program with preventative measures.47 The gov-
ernment will look to the scope and existence of a regular, intensive, and
comprehensive environmental compliance program.4 8 In addressing
this factor, it is very important whether the program was adopted with
sufficient means to address noncompliance and in a timely and good
faith manner.49 A corporation's compliance program will not be ade-
quate without timely and consistent follow-up or remediation.5 ° As
39. United States Department of Justice, supra note 33, at 3. The guidelines indi-
cate that a disclosure would not be prompt and timely if a law enforcement or regula-
tory authority became aware of the violation before disclosure. Id.
40. Id. Consideration is also given to the quantity and quality of the information
provided in the disclosure. Id.
41. Id. at 3.
42. Id.
43. Id. United States Department of Justice, supra note 33, at 3-4.
44. Id. at 3.
45. Id. at 4.
46. Id. at 3-4.
47. United States Department of Justice, supra note 33, at 4.
48. Id. This program may include either a compliance or management environmen-
tal audit. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 4-5.
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the Weyerhaeuser case illustrated, 51 a corporation cannot embrace an
environmental compliance program half-heartedly and hope to escape
criminal punishment. A corporation must act upon the results of these
programs and audits to receive any leniency.5 2
The Department of Justice guidelines also list the following addi-
tional factors that it will incorporate into its calculus when deciding
whether or not to prosecute: (1) the pervasiveness of the violations in
terms of frequency or inadequate management controls;53 (2) whether
the corporation sufficiently disciplines employees who violate their en-
vironmental compliance program;54 and (3) the corporation's past and
present efforts to remedy violations.55 The weight of any one of the
factors cannot be isolated. Rather, the prosecutorial decision is a com-
prehensive one by taking into account all of these factors. The key to
these guidelines is that they reward the regulated community's good
faith efforts with the appropriate leniency in prosecution, while zeal-
ously prosecuting corporations who make no efforts or bad faith
efforts. 5
6
B. The Environmental Protection Agency's Policy
Unlike specific Department of Justice guidelines, the EPA's position
on environmental auditing is more general and policy oriented.57 The
EPA does not address or cite specific factors. Instead, it states a desire
that the regulated community improve compliance and environmental
51. See supra notes 9-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the United
States' prosecution against Weyerhaeuser Company for discharging pollutants without
a permit.
52. United States Department of Justice, supra note 33, at 4-5 (discussing standards
for evaluating compliance programs).
53. Id. at 5. For example, an ongoing violation of which numerous employees are
aware, but to which neither employees nor management have responded may indicate
that the company lacks a meaningful compliance program. Id. Also, the "obviousness,
seriousness, duration, history, and frequency of noncompliance" may indicate the per-
vasiveness of any noncompliance. Id.
54. Id. Crucial to this factor is whether or not the corporation has created an at-
mosphere that indicates to all employees that the company will neither condone nor
permit. Id.
55. Id. In determining whether to prosecute, the Department of Justice attorney
will consider the company's timely and good faith efforts to comply with state or federal
authorities. Id. at 5-6.
56. United States Department of Justice, supra note 33, at 14.
57. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 23.
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management practices.5" The policy then outlines EPA's position on
several environmental audit issues.59 The EPA treats environmental
audits as completely voluntary programs for corporations, 60 specifi-
cally rejecting any mandatory audit requirement. 61 The EPA also en-
deavors to entice corporations to adopt environmental audits by
promoting and praising their benefits.62
In its policy statement, the EPA clearly attempts to rally support for
the environmental audit from within the regulated community, using
the carrot and stick method. The agency first proffers environmental
audits as management's solution to meeting their compliance responsi-
bilities (the carrot),63 then it reminds regulated entities of these respon-
sibilities under the environmental statutes (the stick). 6  Using a very
deferential approach, the EPA declares that environmental auditing
will remain a voluntary activity because it does not want to interfere
with business decisions.65 Apparently, the EPA believes its present
level of enforcement and prosecution is sufficient to spur the regulated
community into action.
The EPA emphasizes environmental audits' benefits to companies as
a way of enticing companies to implement environmental audit pro-
grams. 66 The EPA argues that environmental audits have emerged be-
cause of sound business reasons,67 such as improved environmental
performance and awareness of regulatory requirements,6" the develop-
ment of solutions to common environmental problems, 69 and better en-
vironmental management.7° Perhaps most importantly, the EPA
contends that such audits will make corporate policy environmentally
proactive, instead of reactive to crises or agency investigations.71 Thus,
58. Id. at 25,006.
59. Id. at 25,007-08.
60. Id. at 25,007.
61. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 25,007.
62. Id. at 25,006-08.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 25,006-07.
65. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 25,007.
66. Id. at 25,006.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 25,006.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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corporations will avoid violations and their resultant fines and penalties
because, instead of remedying transgressions, the corporations will
have prevented them from ever occurring.
Aside from the above advantages of voluntary corporate environ-
mental compliance programs, the EPA refused to provide any other
incentives. Specifically, it declined to agree to forego inspections or
other enforcement actions.7 2 The EPA would only concede that facili-
ties with good compliance records may receive fewer inspections7" or
that the EPA "may" consider the entity's compliance program and
subsequent responses in exercising its discretion.74 Meanwhile, the
agency refused to grant internally generated environmental compliance
reports absolute confidentiality. 5 On the one hand, the EPA recog-
nizes the inhibiting and detrimental effect that their access to these re-
ports will have upon corporate auditing. Therefore, it is their policy
not to request these audit reports unless the circumstances warrant.76
However, the EPA goes on to reserve all rights to request these re-
ports.7 7 As a result, corporations receive mixed signals.
The EPA has also used environmental audits in other contexts, such
as settlements and consent decrees.78 While they have advocated the
72. Id. at 25,007.
73. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 25,007.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. EPA states, "[therefore, as a matter of policy, EPA will not routinely re-
quest environmental audit reports." Id.
77. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 25,007-08. See
Danzig et al., supra note 28, at 7-11 (discussing when the EPA can obtain audit re-
ports); Adams, supra note 27, at 5 (advising EPA negotiators to "expressly reserve
EPA's right to review audit-related documents"); Memorandum from James M. Strock,
EPA Assistant Administrator, to Regional Administrators et al., Policy on the Use of
Supplemental Enforcement Projects in EPA Settlements (Feb. 12, 1991) (on file with
Washington University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law) (addressing, in part,
the EPA's ability to request audit reports as part of the EPA's settlements).
78. See Danzig et al., supra note 28, at 7-8 (discussing EPA's use of compliance and
management auditing provisions in settlement negotiations); Strock, supra note 2, at
10,330 (recognizing EPA's use of environmental auditing provisions in enforcement set-
tlement since 1986 as a means of enhancing compliance); see, ag., United States v.
Unichem Int'l, Inc., No. CR90-0057-J, 1990 WL 264544 (D. Wyo. Nov. 5, 1990) (or-
dering the corporation to conduct an environmental audit); United States v. Eagle-
Picher Indus., Civ. No. 87-5100-CV-SW-8, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13206 (W.D. Mo.
Sept. 29, 1990) (approving a consent decree requiring an environmental audit); United
States v. Browning-Ferris Indus. Chem. Servs., 704 F. Supp. 1355, 1360, 1374-79 (M.D.
La. 1988) (approving a consent decree requiring an environmental audit).
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voluntariness of adopting environmental audits, the EPA has not hesi-
tated to incorporate them into settlements.7 9 Following the issuance of
their Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, the EPA adopted a
policy on including environmental audit provisions in enforcement set-
tlements. 0 In the settlement context, the EPA possesses a broad range
of options"1 with one drawback: Requiring an environmental audit in
a settlement is a reactive policy that does not stop the initial violation.
This audit should prevent most violations after the settlement, but it
does little to aid EPA's enforcement goal of proactive management or
encouraging corporate compliance efforts before violations occur.
IV. OTHER AUDITING PROGRAMS OF FEDERAL AGENCIES
The essential goal of voluntary internal environmental audits is to
motivate the regulated community into policing itself and disclosing all
violations. Many other federal agencies' regulatory schemes revolve
around similar goals. This section will examine a few of these policies
to determine if they would be helpful in the environmental compliance
arena.
A. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Recently, the FAA administrator, James B. Busey, announced that
his agency was implementing a solution-based audit and disclosure
program. 2 To qualify, carriers that discover inadvertent violations
must correct and report them to the FAA immediately and put in place
FAA acceptable procedures to ensure that violations do not reoccur.8 3
79. See Adams, supra note 27 (providing guidelines for EPA negotiators regarding
the use of auditing provisions in enforcement settlements).
80. See id.
81. See Danzig et al., supra note 28, at 7-8 (describing the types of audit provisions
that EPA has negotiated); Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 23, at
25,007-08 (identifying situations in which settlement agreements are likely to include
environmental audit provisions).
82. Federal Aviation Administration, United States Department of Transportation
Compliance/Enforcement Bulletin No. 90-6 (March 29, 1990) [hereinafter Federal Avi-
ation Administration] (on file with Washington University Journal of Urban and Con-
temporary Law). See Frank Friedman, Is This Job Worth It?, ENVTL. F. May/June
1991, 20, at 23 (arguing that the risk of criminal and civil liability and the recordkeep-
ing requirement may make conscientious environmental managers wary of remaining in
their positions).
83. Federal Aviation Administration, supra note 82, at 24. The policy states that
the FAA will not seek civil penalties if: 1) the certificate holder voluntarily discloses a
failure to comply with FAA regulations before the Agency learns of the violation; 2) the
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If these conditions are met, the FAA will not seek any penalties against
the carrier.
8 4
Busey defends the policy because it aggressively promotes safety by
taking advantage of three circumstances. First, it shifts the focus of
carmers' resources from battling the FAA in compliance matters to en-
hancing safety in their operations.8 5 Second, the airlines are in the best
position to ensure aviation industry safety. 6 Third, this efficient and
effective use of airline resources allows the FAA to maximize its lim-
ited staff and resources to further promote the public's safety.8 7
B. Department of Defense8 8
In response to several publicized instances of procurement fraud, the
Department of Defense and Department of Justice implemented a vol-
untary disclosure program in 1986.89 Under this program, a volunteer-
ing contractor or employee contacts the Pentagon's Office of the
Inspector General.' ° If the alleged violation is not already under inves-
tigation, the party is preliminarily accepted into the program.91 The
contractor then has an independent investigation conducted by counsel
that will be covered by the attorney-client privilege.92 From this privi-
leged document, a written report is drafted and submitted to the Office
of the Inspector General and Department of Justice.93 This report
should describe the infraction, the restitution the contractor is to make,
failure is neither deliberate nor intentional; 3) the violation does not indicate the certifi-
cate holder's lack of basic qualification; 4) the certificate holder has immediately under-
taken corrective action; and 5) the certificate holder agrees to implement measures to
prevent the violation from recurring. Id. See also Farran & Adams, supra note 8, at
10,241 n.15 (discussing government agencies' voluntary disclosure programs).
84. Farran & Adams, supra note 8, at 10,241 n.15. See also Friedman, supra note
82, at 23 (quoting FAA Administrator James B. Busey).
85. Friedman, supra note 82, at 23.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Benjamin B. Klubes, The Department of Defense Voluntary Disclosure
Program, 19 PuB. CoNT. L.J. 504 (1990) for a comprehensive examination of the
Department of Defense's voluntary disclosure program.
89. Benjamin Klubes, EPA Should Borrow Pentagon's Artillery, LEGAL TIMEs,
Aug. 20, 1990, at 18 (arguing that the EPA should adopt the Department of Defense's
voluntary disclosure program).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Klubes, supra note 89, at 18.
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any disciplinary actions taken or to be taken by the contractor, and
what policies and procedures have been implemented to insure these
violations do not occur again.94 Typically, the government will under-
take its own investigation of the misconduct at this stage to verify the
contractor's disclosure.95 The only assurances made to these contrac-
tors is that their voluntary disclosure and cooperation will be consid-
ered in the prosecutorial decision.9 6
The Department of Defense program has been very successful in
achieving the objectives of civil and criminal prosecutions and adminis-
trative debarment.97 In 1989 the program accepted 156 disclosures
and recovered over eighty-two million dollars.9 8 Fiscal 1990 saw over
$117 million recovered from contractor fraud.99 Despite potential
criminal and civil liability, the defense industry itself initiated the De-
fense Department's voluntary disclosure program primarily because of
the benefits for both industry and government.' °°
C. The Environmental Protection Agency's Toxic Substances Control
Act'' Disclosure Program
The EPA has already implemented a voluntary disclosure program
under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) that encourages com-
panies to conduct internal audits, correct violations, and disclose the
findings.' °2 Under the TSCA program, civil penalties are automati-
cally reduced by twenty-five percent if the company discloses the viola-
tion before the EPA learns of it.' An additional twenty-five percent
may be deducted if the violation is disclosed within thirty days of the
company's discovery of a possible violation."° Besides disclosure, the
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Klubes, supra note 89, at 18. The program has also been relatively inexpensive
to administer. Id.
98. Id.
99. DOD Debars Record 511 Contractors in Second Half of FY 1990, IG Reports,
Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) (Dec. 24, 1990).
100. Klubes, supra note 89, at 19 (noting that the Defense Department's program
evolved from a defense industry reform report signed by 24 major defense contractors).
101. 26 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988).
102. Farran & Adams, supra note 8, at 10,241.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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program encourages appropriate remediation of the violation by al-
lowing EPA the discretion to reduce the penalty another fifteen percent
if the company reasonably and satisfactorily addresses the violation."05
Additionally, the EPA has initiated a program under TSCA Section
8(e) to encourage companies to audit their environmental compliance
and disclose any violations."° 6 Several regulated companies signed an
administrative consent agreement with the EPA in which they agree to
conduct a compliance audit and disclose the results within 180 days. 0 7
To attract companies to the program, the EPA agreed to stipulated
penalties for the uncovered violations including a one million dollar
cap on the company's liability.10 8
V. DANGERS AND BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING
A. Perceived Drawbacks to Environmental Auditing Programs
The confidentiality of environmental audits or reports is the most
controversial component of any environmental compliance pro-
gram."19 A reasonable environmental audit program will most assur-
105. Id.
106. See Registration and Agreement for TSCA Section 8(e) Compliance Audit
Program, 56 Fed. Reg. 4128 (Feb. 1, 1991) (announcing the opportunity for companies
to register for this program and the program's provisions).
107. Id. at 4129.
108. Id. at 4130.
109. A complete examination of the options for keeping environmental audit re-
ports confidential is beyond the scope of this Recent Development. Numerous articles
and recent judicial decisions, however, have addressed this issue in depth. The follow-
ing discussion identifies the different positions regarding this issue and provides re-
sources for those interested in more information.
Among the traditional defenses raised in response to government requests for compa-
nies' environmental audit reports are the attorney-client and work product privilege.
Sustaining these privileges requires extensive attorney supervision of the audit and some
foreseeable litigation. Authorities diverge as to the feasibility of either approach, but
the majority advise that neither defense is likely to succeed. See Environmental Audit-
ing Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 25,007 (recognizing EPA's authority to request
environmental audit reports); United States v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., No. 88-6681, 1989
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12267 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1989) (holding that the attorney-client privi-
lege does not extend to reports unless the communication is between client and attorney
- in his capacity as an attorney - and the communication's purpose is to provide legal
assistance). See, e.g., United States v. Dexter Corp., 132 F.R.D. 8 (D. Conn. 1990)
(rejecting corporations' claim that environmental evaluation reports were privileged);
FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 104-06; Frank B. Friedman & David A. Giannotti, Envi-
ronmental Self-Assessment, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 345,
377-78 (David Sive & Frank Friedman eds., 1987); Danzig et al., supra note 28, at 5-6
(discussing EPA's authority to obtain information in audit reports); Abbott, supra note
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edly produce a written record that charts a company's environmental
compliance. 1 Once a record exists, one of two things may occur:
The company may voluntarily disclose any violations and their plan to
remedy them; or they may conceal the results of their audit and ad-
dress the violations privately. Both paths are fraught with danger. In
the first situation, once the violations are made public the company has
opened itself to citizen suits in which plaintiffs might seek to discover
26, at 234 (examining whether factual material in environmental audit drafts is privi-
leged); Farran & Adams, supra note 88, at 10,242 (suggesting procedures companies
can undertake to increase the likelihood that the results of environmental audits remain
confidential); Friedman, supra note 82, at 23-24 (recognizing that the attorney-client
privilege does not protect most internal documents); Klubes, supra note 89, at 19 (dis-
cussing civil plaintiff's ability to access environmental audit reports submitted to EPA);
Moore et al., supra note 5, at 12-13 (questioning why attorneys do not always advise
their clients to conduct environmental audits); Reed, supra note 24, at 10,304-07 (dis-
cussing governmental and private entities' ability to access environmental audit re-
ports).
Some commentators in regulated industries advocate a self-critical analysis or self-
evaluative privilege. This privilege has received limited recognition in the health care
industry and in Title VII actions. In support of this privilege, commentators argue that
self-evauation furthers the public interest. If the reports are available publicly, compa-
nies will neither correct nor report problems freely. See, e.g., Danzig et al., supra note
28, at 5-6 (arguing that it may not be practical to bring the entire environmental audit
process within the self-evaluation privilege); Farran & Adams, supra note 88, at 10,240
(suggesting a limited safe harbor to companies that implement environmental audit pro-
grams); see also FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207,210-12 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that
the self-evaluative privilege did not protect reports compiled to comply with National
Consumer Relations Audit); Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898, 906-07
(8th Cir. 1979) (holding that implementing a memorandum to share information be-
tween two government agencies did not violate a self-evaluative privilege); United States
v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 1978) (enforcing IRS summons for internal audit
and reports), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564
F.2d 663, 667 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that the EEOC's request for affirmative action
program and related information did not violate a privilege for self-evaluative docu-
ments), cert. denied sub nor. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Brown, 435 U.S. 995 (1978);
O'Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.R.D. 211, 218 (D. Mass. 1980) (holding that self-
evaluation privilege did not protect employer from disclosing data in the self-evaluation
portion of its affirmative action plan); Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96
HARv. L. REv. 1083, 1091-1100 (1983) (criticizing courts' approaches to applying the
self-critical privilege); Reed, supra note 24, at 10,306-07 (recognizing that at most the
self-evaluation privilege is available in private actions); Moore, et. al., supra note 5, at
13-14 (arguing that a self-evaluation privilege would encourage audits and increase their
effectiveness).
110. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the mechanics
of conducting an environmental audit. See also Moore et al., supra note 5, at 8 (arguing
that environmental audits are risky because, in the absence of a privilege, the govern-
ment or a civil litigant may use the resulting written record against the company).
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the environmental audit. I The company also puts itself at the risk of
being criminally prosecuted by the government, having itself given the
prosecutors the evidence of its knowledge.112 The second path is also
dangerous if the government decides to investigate the company and
obtains a copy of the audit. Any chance of prosecutorial leniency is
especially slim in this circumstance.
With no guarantees of amnesty or leniency, 113 this predicament led
many regulated entities to avoid conducting environmental audits,
rather than creating a record that could convict them.114 As the use of
criminal penalties increased, this policy of ignorance began to look
more reasonable,115 especially as courts increasingly upheld individual
criminal liability for these violations.1 16 The EPA's stated policy of
not regularly requesting audit reports1 17 did not comfort the environ-
mentally regulated community. Although not regularly requesting au-
dit reports may have been sufficient in 1986, recent legislation118 brings
this policy's viability into serious doubt. In further support of the con-
fidential treatment that environmental audit reports should receive,
companies contend that these reports will reveal trade secrets to com-
111. See Danzig et al., supra note 28, at 4 (recognizing potential exposure to liabil-
ity); Reed, supra note 24, at 10,304 (noting that liberal discovery rules would give any
litigant access to audit reports).
112. Van Cleve, supra note 27, at 23; Reed, supra note 24, at 10,304.
113. See Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 25,004;
United States Department of Justice, supra note 33, at 14-15 (providing that conducting
an environmental audit does not give the company a right or benefit enforceable against
the Department of Justice's decision to prosecute); see also Van Cleve, supra note 27, at
18 (discussing EPA's decision not to offer incentives for companies to conduct environ-
mental audits); Moore et al., supra note 5, at 3 (noting that EPA's auditing policy does
not assure companies that the government will not use the information they gather
against them).
114. See supra note 109 discussing the risks that environmental audits pose to com-
panies and that those risks act as a disincentive for companies to conduct environmental
audits.
115. See Moore et al., supra note 5, at 12-13 (recognizing that some attorneys rec-
ommend that companies do not conduct environmental audits because of the risks of
later prosecution); Van Cleve, supra note 27, at 22-23 (stating that corporate attorneys
often advise companies not to conduct audits at all, particularly if the company does not
intend to respond to an audit's result).
116. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text for examples of the increase in
individual criminal prosecutions.
117. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 25,007.
118. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text for a discussion of recent legisla-
tion which will increase EPA's criminal investigation staff, increase fines for criminal
violations, and possibly create substantial jail sentences for violators.
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petitors."I9 The regulated community contends that environmental au-
dits will remain in disfavor unless some protection is afforded these
companies or individuals from criminal prosecution, or the audit re-
ports are treated confidentially or as privileged information.12 °
The results of internal environmental compliance audits may give
rise to other obligations for the company. Recent decisions and pro-
nouncements of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have
made a company's environmental compliance record subject to poten-
tial disclosure.' 2 1 Failure to disclose relevant environmental informa-
tion could lead to SEC sanctions for knowingly making inaccurate
filings. 122
Lastly, some companies may find it economically disadvantageous to
audit and thus comply with environmental statutes due to compliance
costs.123 The United States Department of Commerce has estimated
that environmental compliance costs industry approximately seventy
billion dollars a year. 12 4 Meanwhile, EPA amassed a total of thirty-five
million dollars in fines in 1989.125 Thus, one could contend that an
atmosphere is created in which cheating costs less than compliance.
126
119. See Danzig et al., supra note 28, at 4; Farran & Adams, supra note 8, at
10,242; Reed, supra note 24, at 10,304.
120. See supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text discussing risks which arise
from environmental audits.
121. See In re Occidental Petroleum Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 34-16950,
[1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,622 (July 2, 1980) (accepting a
settlement offer regarding company's failure to disclose environmental matters com-
plaints); In re United States Steel Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 16223, [1979-1980
Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,319 (Sept. 27, 1979) (accepting the
USSC's settlement offer regarding its failure to adequately disclose environmental mat-
ters). See also Friedman, supra note 82, at 23-24; Van Cleve, supra note 27, at 36-40.
See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 100-02 (identifying accurate SEC disclosure
as a benefit of an environmental assessment program); Environmental Law Institute,
Environmental Audit Issue Paper: Duties to Report or Disclose Information on the
Environmental Aspects of Business Activities 42-43 (Sept. 1985) (outlining the SEC
reporting requirements).
122. Friedman, supra note 82, at 23-24.
123. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the mechanics
of undertaking an environmental audit.
124. Lavelle, supra note 2, at 48.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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B. Benefits of Environmental Auditing Programs
Properly conducted environmental audits provide numerous benefits
to the regulated company, regulatory agency, and the general public.
For the company, an effective environmental auditing program can po-
tentially shield corporate management from some criminal liability by
documenting the preventative measures undertaken to cease any crimi-
nal conduct that had been occurring. 127 Corporations that are govern-
ment contractors can also avoid another recent enforcement tool of
prosecutors - suspension and debarment. 12' Likewise, an audit may
protect a corporation from future negligence claims.1 29 Notably, these
advantages will only be viable if the corporation is willing to act swiftly
upon the results of the environmental audit.1
3 0
Compared to the different enforcement approaches available to the
government (administrative, civil, or criminal), environmental compli-
ance and auditing provides corporations with a unified and coherent
approach that can resolve all aspects of the government's enforcement
action. 131 These audits and resulting enforcement agreements with the
government may preclude the private citizen suit. Most provisions
which allow citizen suits actually prohibit them when the government
is diligently prosecuting the violation. 132 Thus, corporations could ar-
gue that the disclosure and any resulting agreements with the regula-
tory agency precludes the prosecution of any citizen suit.1
33
127. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 99-100 (identifying the possibility of avoiding
civil and criminal liability as a benefit of an environmental assessment program); Fried-
man, supra note 82, at 23 (discussing the danger of criminal liability which may result
from a company's failure to conduct an environmental audit); Klubes, supra note 89, at
18; Van Cleve, supra note 27, at 22.
128. Klubes, supra note 89, at 18.
129. See Friedman, supra note 82, at 23 (addressing the role of environmental au-
dits in avoiding negligence liability).
130. Friedman, supra note 82, at 23; Van Cleve, supra note 27, at 22-23.
131. See Klubes, supra note 89, at 18 (discussing how companies who conduct envi-
ronmental audits limit the possibility of criminal prosecution and civil actions).
132. Klubes, supra note 89, at 18. See, eg., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b)(l)(B) (1988) (prohibiting citizen suits if an administrator or state is prosecut-
ing a civil or criminal suit seeking compliance).
133. Klubes, supra note 89, at 18. See Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. East-
man Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a settlement between
the government and a violator will bar citizen suits if the settlement causes the violation
to cease and the probability of recurrence is low); Public Interest Research Group v.
Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing that
where a violator has made a good faith attempt to comply with a permit, and failed
because of technical or economic problems, and the EPA has excused noncompliance,
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A comprehensive environmental audit program provides a corpora-
tion with a number of internal benefits. In general, audits can greatly
aid a corporation in its environmental compliance planning and priori-
tization, reduction of health and safety risks, personnel training, and
budgeting and resource allocation.134 Environmental audit programs
also reinforce the corporation's commitment to environmental compli-
ance at all management levels and project a positive corporate ap-
proach toward the environment.135 All of these advantages to audits
can lead to a better relationship between the public and regulatory
community.
The advantages to the public are both obvious and subtle. Clearly,
increased corporate auditing and follow-up will reduce pollution, but it
will also decrease the cost of environmental enforcement or allow it to
be better utilized. The government benefits in many of the same ways
as the general public. Increased corporate auditing and compliance
frees regulatory enforcement resources to address the persistent
transgressors.
VI. ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING AND DISCLOSURE
POLICY PROPOSAL
Crucial to any comprehensive environmental auditing program is co-
operation amongst the regulatory community; all agencies must gener-
ally agree to and play by similar, if not identical, rules. However, the
EPA and Department of Justice must also maintain a great deal of
flexibility and full prosecutorial discretion. This discretion is necessary
to maintain an active and effective enforcement effort. This aspect of a
comprehensive auditing program remains important because not every-
one will implement internal audit programs or even attempt to comply
with environmental statutes.
The Department of Justice and EPA should propose a policy of
voluntary environmental auditing, self-disclosure, and corrective ac-
tion.'3 6 The stated goal of such a policy should be complete compli-
ance with all applicable environmental statutes and regulations. The
the court may reduce the penalty in related citizen suits), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1018
(1991).
134. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 103-05.
135. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 25,006. See
FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 104 (discussing how environmental audit programs can
improve public relations).
136. In general, this proposal is consistent with statements made by members of
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keys to this policy would be a corporation's adoption of a bona fide
environmental audit program, prompt and complete disclosure, and
good faith efforts at remedying uncovered violations.
This policy should create a safe harbor for those companies that un-
dertake audits, disclose violations, and begin corrective actions. This
safe harbor would protect qualifying companies from criminal prosecu-
tion for up to six months 3 ' following their discovery of the violation.
For a corporation to qualify, their violation may not have been inten-
tional, it must have been reported in a timely manner to the EPA, and
it may not have resulted in actual harm to human health or the envi-
ronment. 138 If the corporation has not corrected the violation after six
months, the agencies may proceed with criminal sanctions. The gov-
ernment will be free to pursue any other administrative or civil remedy.
However, the government should focus on either encouraging compli-
ance or recovering the corporation's economic benefit from the viola-
both Houses of Congress while discussing the new Clean Air Act and its criminal en-
forcement provisions. The Statement of Senate Managers stated:
Voluntarily initiated environmental audits should be encouraged and, in the
course of exercising prosecutorial discretion under the criminal provisions of sub-
section 113(c), the Administrator and the Attorney General of the United States
should, as a general matter, refrain from using information obtained by a person in
the course of a voluntarily initiated environmental audit against such person to
prove the knowledge element of a violation of this Act if-(l) such person immedi-
ately transmitted or caused the transmission of such information to the Adminis-
trator or the State air pollution control authorities, as appropriate; (2) such person
corrected or caused the correction of such violation as quickly as possible; and (3)
in the case of a violation that presented an imminent and substantial endangerment
to public health or welfare or the environment, such person immediately elimi-
nated or caused the elimination of such endangerment to assure prompt protection
of public health or welfare or the environment.
CHAFEE-BAUCUS STATEMENT OF SENATE MANAGERS, 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., 136
CONG. REc. S16,933, S16,951 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
The House Managers expressed similar sentiments:
Nothing in subsection 113(c) is intended to discourage owners or operators of
sources subject to this Act from conducting self-evaluations or self-audits and act-
ing to correct any problems identified .... Knowledge gained by an individual
solely in conducting an audit or while attempting to correct any deficiencies identi-
fied in the audit or the audit report itself should not ordinarily form the basis of the
intent which results in criminal penalties.
JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, 101ST
CONG., 2D SESS., 136 CONG. REC. H13,197, H13,201 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990).
137. See Danzig et al., supra note 28, at 10 (discussing instances in which the EPA
allowed companies a six-month grace period after completing an environmental audit to
correct violations that the audit discovered).
138. See Farran & Adams, supra note 8, at 10,240 (suggesting conditions under
which EPA should provide companies a safe harbor).
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tion. Furthermore, the policy should promote substantial credits for
corporations that disclose environmental violations.13 9
This safe harbor approach should remove many of the concerns
about a defendant's environmental audit report providing the knowl-
edge element in a criminal prosecution. Any party that fails to remedy
the violation after the allotted six months, without some intervening
circumstances, will independently provide the knowledge element
without the prosecution needing the audit report. The government's
access to audit reports is an important element of its enforcement pro-
cess that should not be weakened; however, the government should ex-
ercise restraint in requesting these reports.14°  Although the
government's use of internal audit reports should not be precluded,
corporations and individuals should have an affirmative defense in
criminal cases.14
1
In addition, the EPA and Department of Justice must respond to
industry's concern over the use of internal audit reports in private citi-
zen suits. The Department of Justice and EPA should urge the courts
to adopt a "limited waiver" theory. 42 Under this theory, the govern-
ment could waive any claim of attorney-client or work product privi-
lege. 143 The limited waiver is a necessary middle ground to encourage
further voluntary disclosure. Citizen suits, originally intended as an
additional enforcement mechanism,"44 become unnecessary if the cor-
poration discloses the audit report results to the government and cor-
rects the violation. Confidential business information and trade secrets
should be adequately protected by provisions in the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act1 45 or may be sealed in civil actions through a Rule 26(c)
139. Moore et al., supra note 5, at 23-24. This credit program would be substan-
tially similar to the percentage reductions in the TSCA program. See supra notes 103-
105 and accompanying text explaining the TSCA § 5 program.
140. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text discussing corporate fears
about the EPA's use of environmental audits.
141. Farran & Adams, supra note 8, at 10,240 (recognizing that an affirmative de-
fense may allow companies to reduce or eliminate their civil or criminal liability).
142. Klubes, supra note 89, at 19 (noting that without a limited waiver privilege,
voluntary disclosures will be discouraged because all documents from an internal inves-
tigation would be available for anybody to see).
143. Id. This waiver would only apply to the government; not to any third party.
Id.
144. See, e-g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988) (providing for citizen
suits).
145. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
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protective order.
146
CONCLUSION
Promoting environmental compliance to the largest extent possible
by the regulated community should be the goal of EPA. Environmen-
tal audits provide a mechanism by which the regulated community can
increase their compliance and police itself. The Department of Justice
and EPA agree that they should encourage environmental audits. 47
Unfortunately, they have only paid lip service to this mechanism by
leaving significant disincentives to auditing programs in place.148 The
EPA and Department of Justice have had a positive experience with
corporate environmental audits.49 Likewise, other governmental
agencies' experience with self-auditing and voluntary disclosure has
been very successful.' 50 If these programs from other agencies were
adapted to the environmental context, there is every reason to believe
that they will be just as successful.
Patrick J. Ennis*
146. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(C) (allowing parties to move to restrict discovery).
147. See supra notes 33-81 and accompanying text discussing the federal agencies'
respective approaches to environmental audits.
148. Moore et al., supra note 5, at 2 (noting that EPA and Justice Department
initiatives create a disincentive to auditing because "[a]udits are being used to trigger
enforcement or to escalate enforcement from a civil penalty to a criminal sanction").
149. See supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text describing the EPA's TSCA
§§ 5 & 8(e) programs. See also Farran & Adams, supra note 8, at 10,242 (recognizing
the success of the TSCA § 8(e) program and advocating that other EPA programs
adopt a similar provision); Strock, supra note 2, at 10,330 (stating that EPA's use of
environmental auditing provisions in enforcement settlements has successfully identified
and helped to correct violations).
150. See supra notes 82-100 and accompanying text describing the FAA's and De-
fense Department's voluntary disclosure and self-policing policies.
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